"One of two things is usually lacking in what we call philosophy of art: either the philosophy or the art." - Schlegel

Sunday, December 4, 2011

Fear: Fact or Fiction?

Walton maintains that observers do not actually fear fictional entities; rather, it is fictionally true that we fear these entities. Necessary to his theory, by his own admission, is that the relevant principle of make-believe is accepted by someone. Walton contends that it is accepted by the observer.

1) Is accepting this principle a deliberate act? How might Walton respond to someone who was passing through a room with a movie playing and experienced fear at the content, essentially being affected by accident? Did the observer in this hypothetical accept this principle if he or she was not intending to watch a movie, to engage in a fictional world?

2) Is Walton's "Pretend Theory" pejorative to artists? If artists cannot elicit fear or any emotion in the observer (as also false is our hatred of Iago, envy of Superman...etc...) does this depreciate the role of art in general?

Sunday, November 27, 2011

The Nature of Natural Appreciation

Carlson begins with the supposition that the appreciation from nature is or ought to be different from the appreciation of art. He concludes that the appreciation of nature must be the acknowledgment of the natural environment as an obtrusive foreground. He is slightly unclear as to what this exactly means, but does maintain that it involves knowledge of the environment and the ability to distinguish between aspects thereof. We do not merely experience it as an amalgamation of experience, but use knowledge to make some of the data deliberate and meaningful.

Is this is, any substantive way, distinct from appreciation of art? In responding to this question consider carefully Carlson's descriptions of our appreciation of art.

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Question 9: Music

I apologize. Last week I did not post a question. We originally planned to spend but a single day on Dickie and when the decision was made to extend the unit, I failed to realize the consequent of needing a question. I am sorry for that. Here, however, are the questions for this week.

Kivy articulates a contour theory for the expressivism of music, claiming that the expression is due to the similarity between the emotion expressed and the behavior of a person operating under that particular emotion. However, even he raises some objections to his own theory and admits there may not be answers to them.

1) Does the Contour Theory have merit? What of his objections? Is his notion of "there is no better explanation" a legitimate reason for believing it?

Hanslick maintains that music is exclusively nonrepresentational. Unlike poetry and literature and painting, music lacks the ability to represent anything beyond itself.

2) Is this true? Because music lacks any visual, lacks any actual verbal component, does it follow that it cannot represent?

Sunday, October 30, 2011

Question 7: The Artworld

Perceptually indistinguishable counterparts are problematic for the artworld, i.e. which is art and which is not? Danto's answer, of course, is twofold. There must exist a theory within which the object can be interpreted as art, and secondly, there must exist an artworld.

1. What is to be made of these art conferring theories? Can anyone hold such a theory, and as such, can anyone confer the status of art to any object as long as they postulate a theory to encompass it? Either contend that my interpretation of this criterion is mistaken or discuss the ramifications of this stipulation.

2. Danto maintains that an artworld must exist for there to be art. Without aestheticians, there can be no art. But an artworld is an atmosphere of artistic theory and a knowledge of the history of art. There must exist artistic theory before there can be art? There must be a history of art before there is any art? Discuss this apparent tension. Is there a way to diffuse this apparent contradiction?

Thursday, October 20, 2011

Question 6: Inhumanity

John Dewey maintains that artistic experience of creation is not wholly unlike common everyday experience; it is not significantly unique. Dewey at times uses exclusive terms as "human being" and other times tends to painstakingly avoid talking of the subject, of the artist. And yet in still other locations he speaks about non-human animals. "A bird builds its nest and a beaver its dam when internal organic pressures cooperate with external materials so that the former are fulfilled and the latter are transformed in a satisfying culmination. We may hesitate to apply the word 'art,' since we doubt the presence of conscious intent..." He goes on to mention a distinguishing contribution of man (sic).

My question then is this: from what you understand of Dewey's artistic theory, what would be his response to the possibility of non-human art? Would he rule it out? Would he admit the possibility? Would he be certain it exists? Or yet some other answer?

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Question 5 (Elitism and Formalism)

In the hope of evoking a substantive response my question shall be in two, relatively unrelated, except as it applies to Bell, parts.

A popular criticism of Bell is that of elitism; it is not wholly unwarrented and it is entirely understandable. His prose is wrought with exclusionary language and rampant condescension. This runs the risk of embittering readers and tacitly encouraging to believe him despite any quality of his theory. The first part of question then is this: is Bell an elitist? Is elitism a fault of a theory? Can a theory be both elitist and correct? Where along the continuum of elitism does a theory become visciously elitist?

Bell is a formalist. His theory of art, a la Moore, is contentless. It is naught but the lines and colours, the forms and combination of forms, that stir our aesthetic emotion and thus render something art. Professor Johnson has already asked you to consider the relationship between significant form ans aesthetic emotion which will immerse you in his theory so I shan't repeat as such. On Bell's formalism, is he suggesting that we ought to divorce ourselves from content during appreciation, and is that possible? Are formalists correct to deny content?

Sunday, October 2, 2011

Tolstoy Contradictions

Aristotle first articulated the law of non-contradiction: it states that two contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. P cannot be both P and non-P at the same time. Now, to Tolstoy:

Tolstoy maintains that for an object to be art, the artist must successfully communicate a a specific emotion to an observer. If this fails, it is not art. If this succeeds, it is art. This leads to a potential problem, however. If an object successfully conveys an emotion to one observer but not the other, what then can be said as far as the objects art status? It successfully conveyed an emotion, and is, ergo, art. But it also simultaneously failed to convey that specific emotion and is, thus, not art. So we are then presented with an object that is both art and not art at the same time.

Question? Would this scenario violate the law of non-contradiction? Is there a reading of Tolstoy that saves his theory from this objection? What ramifications does this hypothetical have for Tolstoy's theory of art? I and presupposing that this scenario is not altogether unlikely, but if you think it is, feel free to say so and back up your claim.

Sunday, September 25, 2011

Continuum of Bias

Hume maintains an empirically difficult position due to the vastness of discord of taste that he cites early as unavoidable and obvious. There are classics though that have endured the test of time; Homer is as appreciated, if not more so, than he was in millennia past. Therefore, he concludes, there are certain principles of approbation and blame. If these fail, of course, it must be due to some defect in the critic. An individual in fever cannot rely on sense of taste, a person affected with jaundice annot rely on color...etc... A quality of a critic then must be to be free of bias. His theory of superior critics, the views of which is that upon which we must base our own tastes, depends on this notion. So then, here is my question: do you think it is possible to achieve such a level of disinterest? Hume himself admits that even critics may disagree on some particulars due to the presence of bias. Bias must fall along a continuum; surely it is possible to be less biased or more biased than another, so perhaps the critic just needs to be as unbias as possible? But would this not then require further elucidation, to wit, the desired point along the continuum?

Question in full? Can a critic, can a human being exist, even temporarily in a state of meaningful (excluding sleep, coma, death...etc...) unbias? If not, how unbias ought he or she to be? Does there exist this desired extent of objectivity?

Sunday, September 18, 2011

Apology or Censure?

Herein lies the questions for the week 2 of blogging.

A prima facie reading of Republic lends itself to the interpretation that Plato was a severe advocate for the censure of art. Plato argues that poetry (poesis: greek for 'making') is an imitation of an imitation and thus thrice removed from the realm of truth. A memetic theory of art does not require his intricate metaphysical system, and so I shall not address that here. Also vital to his seeming condemnation of art is that art appeals to the emotional aspect of the human psyche, one in constant tension and struggle with the rational. Rationality is of utmost importance to Plato, and as such any entreaty to the emotional is seen as dangerous. Johnston argues in his lecture that a closer examination will beget a more complicated and sensitive image of Plato and his view. Johnston maintains that Plato was well aware of art's potency and how it affected even him. Plato uses art often in Republic, and even Republic itself is a work of fiction. Johnston argues that this is indicative of Plato's acceptance that art may indeed be useful for the dissemination of truth and virtue. It strikes me though, that anything Plato has said via his poesis could have as easily been articulated absent fiction. As students and teachers we do not resort to fiction to articulate the meaning behind the allegory of the cave nor Plato's reasoning of Republic. So while Plato did use art, he did not need to. Plato was well aware that he did not live in his ideal city; art may have been currently useful, if still not useful in the ideal city where all citizens could grasp nonfictional articulations of truth and virtue.

What is your interpretation of Plato's view of art? Be sure to mention its relationship with truth and its potential utility in the dissemination thereof. Once you have done this, agree or disagree with Plato and explain why.

Fictions do present actions and events that did not happen; in this way Plato is correct about their divorce from truth. Is he, however, correct that because of this, art and poetry do not, and cannot, depict truth?

Sunday, September 11, 2011

Toolkit and Aesthetics

Professor Johnson cleverly posed a Q&A that begins our foray into aesthetics while not prematurely retreating from the Took-kit, and my questions this week will attempt to do the same.

1. You all surely noticed that "aesthetics" despite being a branch of philosophy is not on the cover of the tool-kit, although in the entry "Axiology" the authors inform us that aesthetics does indeed fall into that branch of the philosophical triad. Aesthetic theories, however, often hinge on definitions of key terms, and are often dependent on chiefly epistemological hypotheses. Also, art objects are, by necessity, metaphysical units. Why then, as opposed to ontology and epistemology, is aesthetics relegated to the realm of axiology. Posit possible explanations and then agree or disagree with those explanations.

2. Johnson's question asks you to consider the intellectual virtues, and operating under the opinion that these are vital characteristics, I will do the same. It strikes me (and I very well may be mistaken) that while they are all important to philosophy, some may be more relevant and more useful in the particular practice of aesthetics. Which will serve us the best and which are less important? Or, alternatively, disagree with my base supposition (i.e. that some are more important than others) and demonstrate why.

I posed two questions; while you are only obliged to respond to one, I encourage careful consideration and even response to both.

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Business

Good Afternoon,

I would like to take a very brief moment and mention a few things. If you ever need some extra help, whether that is understanding the reading, whether you are confused about policy, or whether you would like help (those of you who so decide) with your research essay, you can contact me via first class and we can arrange a time to meet. Or, if a particular issue in class was interesting to you and you wish to merely continue the conversation; I am happy in either case to get together and talk.

Furthermore, while Professor Johnson will surely mention this, for those of you who decide to blog, one post per week must be in response to a question that I raise; your other blogs may be about any aesthetically relevant thing you wish. While I am well versed in aesthetics, my fallibility is as objective a truth as you can imagine, so in your response to me, do not take my post as gospel. Important to remember are two things: 1) Two blogs a week will earn you a "C" for blogging; it is the absolute minimum. Honors students, rather any good students, should blog substantially more than that. 2) All blog posts must end with a question. I encourage you to seek out good questions asked by your class mates and uses these as the basis for your elective (The posts not in response to me) blog posts.

Have a fruitful seminar