Fear: Fact or Fiction?

Walton maintains that observers do not actually fear fictional entities; rather, it is fictionally true that we fear these entities. Necessary to his theory, by his own admission, is that the relevant principle of make-believe is accepted by someone. Walton contends that it is accepted by the observer.

1) Is accepting this principle a deliberate act? How might Walton respond to someone who was passing through a room with a movie playing and experienced fear at the content, essentially being affected by accident? Did the observer in this hypothetical accept this principle if he or she was not intending to watch a movie, to engage in a fictional world?

2) Is Walton's "Pretend Theory" pejorative to artists? If artists cannot elicit fear or any emotion in the observer (as also false is our hatred of Iago, envy of Superman...etc...) does this depreciate the role of art in general?

The Nature of Natural Appreciation

Carlson begins with the supposition that the appreciation from nature is or ought to be different from the appreciation of art. He concludes that the appreciation of nature must be the acknowledgment of the natural environment as an obtrusive foreground. He is slightly unclear as to what this exactly means, but does maintain that it involves knowledge of the environment and the ability to distinguish between aspects thereof. We do not merely experience it as an amalgamation of experience, but use knowledge to make some of the data deliberate and meaningful.

Is this is, any substantive way, distinct from appreciation of art? In responding to this question consider carefully Carlson's descriptions of our appreciation of art.

Question 9: Music

I apologize. Last week I did not post a question. We originally planned to spend but a single day on Dickie and when the decision was made to extend the unit, I failed to realize the consequent of needing a question. I am sorry for that. Here, however, are the questions for this week.

Kivy articulates a contour theory for the expressivism of music, claiming that the expression is due to the similarity between the emotion expressed and the behavior of a person operating under that particular emotion. However, even he raises some objections to his own theory and admits there may not be answers to them.

1) Does the Contour Theory have merit? What of his objections? Is his notion of "there is no better explanation" a legitimate reason for believing it?

Hanslick maintains that music is exclusively nonrepresentational. Unlike poetry and literature and painting, music lacks the ability to represent anything beyond itself.

2) Is this true? Because music lacks any visual, lacks any actual verbal component, does it follow that it cannot represent?

Question 7: The Artworld

Perceptually indistinguishable counterparts are problematic for the artworld, i.e. which is art and which is not? Danto's answer, of course, is twofold. There must exist a theory within which the object can be interpreted as art, and secondly, there must exist an artworld.

1. What is to be made of these art conferring theories? Can anyone hold such a theory, and as such, can anyone confer the status of art to any object as long as they postulate a theory to encompass it? Either contend that my interpretation of this criterion is mistaken or discuss the ramifications of this stipulation.

2. Danto maintains that an artworld must exist for there to be art. Without aestheticians, there can be no art. But an artworld is an atmosphere of artistic theory and a knowledge of the history of art. There must exist artistic theory before there can be art? There must be a history of art before there is any art? Discuss this apparent tension. Is there a way to diffuse this apparent contradiction?

Question 6: Inhumanity

John Dewey maintains that artistic experience of creation is not wholly unlike common everyday experience; it is not significantly unique. Dewey at times uses exclusive terms as "human being" and other times tends to painstakingly avoid talking of the subject, of the artist. And yet in still other locations he speaks about non-human animals. "A bird builds its nest and a beaver its dam when internal organic pressures cooperate with external materials so that the former are fulfilled and the latter are transformed in a satisfying culmination. We may hesitate to apply the word 'art,' since we doubt the presence of conscious intent..." He goes on to mention a distinguishing contribution of man (sic).

My question then is this: from what you understand of Dewey's artistic theory, what would be his response to the possibility of non-human art? Would he rule it out? Would he admit the possibility? Would he be certain it exists? Or yet some other answer?

Question 5 (Elitism and Formalism)

In the hope of evoking a substantive response my question shall be in two, relatively unrelated, except as it applies to Bell, parts.

A popular criticism of Bell is that of elitism; it is not wholly unwarrented and it is entirely understandable. His prose is wrought with exclusionary language and rampant condescension. This runs the risk of embittering readers and tacitly encouraging to believe him despite any quality of his theory. The first part of question then is this: is Bell an elitist? Is elitism a fault of a theory? Can a theory be both elitist and correct? Where along the continuum of elitism does a theory become visciously elitist?

Bell is a formalist. His theory of art, a la Moore, is contentless. It is naught but the lines and colours, the forms and combination of forms, that stir our aesthetic emotion and thus render something art. Professor Johnson has already asked you to consider the relationship between significant form ans aesthetic emotion which will immerse you in his theory so I shan't repeat as such. On Bell's formalism, is he suggesting that we ought to divorce ourselves from content during appreciation, and is that possible? Are formalists correct to deny content?

Tolstoy Contradictions

Aristotle first articulated the law of non-contradiction: it states that two contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. P cannot be both P and non-P at the same time. Now, to Tolstoy:

Tolstoy maintains that for an object to be art, the artist must successfully communicate a a specific emotion to an observer. If this fails, it is not art. If this succeeds, it is art. This leads to a potential problem, however. If an object successfully conveys an emotion to one observer but not the other, what then can be said as far as the objects art status? It successfully conveyed an emotion, and is, ergo, art. But it also simultaneously failed to convey that specific emotion and is, thus, not art. So we are then presented with an object that is both art and not art at the same time.

Question? Would this scenario violate the law of non-contradiction? Is there a reading of Tolstoy that saves his theory from this objection? What ramifications does this hypothetical have for Tolstoy's theory of art? I and presupposing that this scenario is not altogether unlikely, but if you think it is, feel free to say so and back up your claim.